RA07

RUSSIA 1917: REVOLUTION & BOLSHEVISM

War, power and the test of funding claims

COMPLETE SOURCE-BASED STUDY

A source-based comparison of revolutionary decisions, foreign support and Beter's interpretation.

February · October · German support · Sisson · repression · Beter

Tempus omnia revelat.

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What this volume examines

RA07 is a standalone source-based study in the Research & Analysis series. It distinguishes the history of revolutionary Russia from Beter’s later factional labels. Political activity is not inferred from religion or genealogy.

The focus is 1917. Selected documents from 1918–1920 explain subsequent regime-building, peace, restrictions on rights, civil war and later images of the revolution. This is neither a complete history of the Soviet Union nor a census of all its victims.

The core consists of contemporary decrees, party resolutions and diplomatic telegrams in accessible editions. Named scholarly interpretations supplement them. Particular attention goes to the difference between documented German assistance, disputed particular channels and claims of complete foreign control.

The result is neither exculpatory nor accusatory in advance. Repressive decisions are identified by their actual wording; forgeries and chronological conflations are not accepted even when they support criticism of the regime. Victims remain victims when they do not fit a political narrative.

The complete study contains this edition’s full editorial discussion in PDF, HTML and TXT. The illustrated edition is a shorter orientation guide. Brevity in illustrations must not strengthen conclusions beyond the text. Both languages use identical chapter and source numbers.

Method, dates and limits of access

S01–S36 refer to the source register. An original document, its later edition or translation, scholarly analysis and our own analytical conclusion are distinguished. A source establishes at least what its author wrote; it does not necessarily establish the truth of every assertion.

OS denotes Julian Old Style, NS Gregorian New Style. In 1917 the difference was thirteen days. The familiar names February and October Revolution are retained, while crucial dates are given in both styles. Drafting, adoption and publication dates are distinguished when using editions. [S16]

The Slovak explanations are based on available English translations and the German text cited for Kühlmann. They are not a new critical edition of Russian originals. Political statements are mostly paraphrased; a label in quotation marks does not imply a verbatim translation of an entire sentence.

Kühlmann’s record was read through a historian’s reproduction, not as an archival autograph. Roberts and McGeever supply original scholarly research; not all their underlying archival records were independently inspected. For Lyandres and the Sisson article, access is explicitly limited to abstracts and bibliography. [S17, S19, S21, S23, S30]

Documented, partly documented, unsupported and contradicted by records describe outcomes of this source selection, not certificates of finality. Failure to find a record is not always proof of non-existence; possibility is not proof of actuality. This first edition was produced with AI assistance and has not undergone external academic peer review.

01 / Two revolutions, not one moment

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

In February 1917 by the Russian calendar then in use, the monarchy fell. In October the Bolsheviks and their allies overthrew the Provisional Government. Nicholas II abdicated on March 2 Old Style, or March 15 New Style; the October seizure of power is associated with October 25, or November 7. These dates represent two calendars and two different changes of regime, not competing versions of truth. [S01, S07, S16]

The familiar shortcut that Lenin overthrew the tsar in October therefore misidentifies both the opponent and the sequence. Between abdication and October lay months of struggle over war, land, representation and authority. Supporting the monarchy's fall in spring does not by itself mean supporting the Bolshevik programme in autumn. This distinction becomes decisive when assessing foreign telegrams and financial commitments. [S01, S04, S22]

The calendar reform of 1918 prescribed that January 31 would be followed by February 14. Our chronology labels Old Style as OS and New Style as NS; foreign documents retain their Gregorian dating. A shared year or month is never used, without further examination, to establish causation. [S16]

The analytical question is which event a particular person meant by "the Russian Revolution." An April 1917 letter cannot silently be moved to the period after the November seizure of power. Equally, a later hostile statement cannot erase earlier sympathy. An actor's history can contain a change of position rather than a single permanent allegiance.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · NOT NEW EMPIRICAL DATA

Two events; two calendars. For 1917: NS = OS + 13 days.

> *First establish the date, government and addressee; interpretation follows.*

Sources / notes: S01, S04, S07, S16, S22

02 / War, bread and the breakdown of obedience

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

An account of February must include the burdens of war, supply problems and actions in the streets. Siegelbaum’s overview connects the opening mass protests in Petrograd with women’s demonstrations and demands for bread; workers joined and sections of the garrison eventually mutinied. Without obedient armed forces, an order to suppress protest could not simply be carried out. [S02]

Nicholas II’s own abdication manifesto invokes the war and the need for unity in conducting it. He presents withdrawal as a sacrifice for Russia and transfers succession to his brother. This is the author’s justification for abdication, not a complete explanation of the revolution. Together with the account of protests, however, it shows that war and the crisis of authority appear in the sources themselves, not merely in later theory. [S01]

For assessing foreign intervention, creating a crisis must be distinguished from exploiting it. An outside actor can finance newspapers, facilitate a politician’s return or encourage the disintegration of an enemy army. Such activity does not replace the question of why an appeal found an audience and why the state could not control resistance. This is a causal question, not a moral justification of any revolutionary.

Women demanding food, soldiers refusing an order and a party organiser need not share the same ultimate goal. One party’s eventual victory does not mean that every participant in the initial protest knowingly prepared that party’s regime. This study therefore does not assign the whole of February to a single organisation or a single people.

> *Exploiting a crisis is not the same as explaining all its causes.*

Sources / notes: S01, S02

03 / Political labels are not names of peoples

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

In 1917 several levels of organisation overlapped without being identical: government, political parties, soviets and military committees. The Provisional Government was not a Bolshevik government; a soviet was a council, not automatically Lenin's party. Lenin himself acknowledged in the April Theses that the Bolsheviks were a minority in many soviets. [S03–S05]

A basic orientation includes the liberal Constitutional Democrats, or Kadets; Socialist Revolutionaries, or SRs; Mensheviks and Bolsheviks as rival socialist currents; and other national or labour organisations. Differences concerned revolutionary strategy, war, land, parliament and the national question. This overview is not an exhaustive list of the empire's parties. [S02, S07, S12, S24]

The Bund offers a concrete counterexample to the idea of a single Jewish political command. YIVO's archival guide describes a Jewish labour movement with its own linguistic and organisational tradition. Its Russian branches experienced disputes and division; a section later adopted a communist orientation. It is inaccurate to portray the Bund as permanently and uniformly pro-Bolshevik, or permanently and uniformly anti-Bolshevik. [S24]

For every document, therefore, we identify the particular body and period. "Russian," "Jewish," "socialist" and "Bolshevik" do not designate the same population. Membership of two categories does not establish representation of everyone in either of them. Party responsibility is evidenced by membership and decision-making, not by a surname.

> *Community, party, council and state are different entities.*

Sources / notes: S02, S03, S04, S05, S07, S12, S24

04 / Dual power and Order No. I

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The Petrograd Soviet's order of March 1/14, 1917 addressed primarily the capital's garrison. It required elected committees, placed weapons under their control and subordinated soldiers' political activity to the Soviet. Orders from the Duma's military commission were to be obeyed only when they did not conflict with Soviet decisions. The text also retained service discipline and distinguished it from civil rights outside service. [S03]

It is therefore misleading to quote one sentence and declare that the document simply abolished all discipline throughout the army. Nor was it Lenin's personal order. The central problem was competing legitimacy: who could issue politically binding instructions to armed people? [S03]

In his article on dual power, Lenin described the coexistence of a bourgeois government and a different type of authority based on workers' and soldiers' councils. This is his partisan reading of the situation. The formulation shows how he intended to change it; it does not entitle us to classify every contemporary soviet member as an executor of Lenin's will. [S05]

The distinction between formal office and an enforceable command is also essential for theories of power behind the scenes. A minister may possess a title but lack obedient troops; a council may enjoy soldiers' support without wanting to assume the entire governmental apparatus. A breakdown of authority cannot therefore be explained merely by listing senior officials or alleged sponsors.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · NOT NEW EMPIRICAL DATA



Competing authorities, not the hierarchy of a single command.

> *Office, support and the ability to enforce an order need not belong to the same hands.*

Sources / notes: S03, S05

05 / The April Theses: programme, not an accomplished regime

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

Lenin’s April Theses rejected support for the Provisional Government, demanded a transfer of power to the soviets and called for a reorientation of the party. Concrete proposals included unifying banks under Soviet control and transforming land ownership. Lenin also stated that the immediate task was not simply to introduce socialism in one step, but to establish control over social production and distribution. [S04]

These points give the political conflict substance. There is no need to infer a programme from the religion of someone’s ancestors. Readers can examine what Lenin openly proposed and compare it with the legal measures adopted after the seizure of power. A shared provision in a programme and a later decree does not, however, demonstrate uniform local practice. [S04, S14]

The theses also acknowledge a Bolshevik minority in many councils and call for explaining the party’s position to the masses. This contradicts the simplification that the Bolsheviks already exercised unconditional control of all soviets in April. Political predominance had to be acquired rather than merely announced. [S04]

A revolutionary programme should be read at three levels: the intended change, the organisation able to pursue it, and the outcome. Criticism must not mistake the author’s justification for our endorsement. Presenting Lenin’s arguments does not endorse his later repression; without understanding those arguments, however, the political struggle cannot be explained intelligibly.

> *A programme states an objective; it does not establish implementation or public consent.*

Sources / notes: S04, S14

06 / July and Kornilov: the path was not linear

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The July crisis brought accusations that Bolshevik leaders were acting with German support. The published prosecutorial account refers to witnesses, commercial contacts and alleged financial channels. It establishes that a specific accusation existed in summer 1917; its financial conclusions still require examination. Chapter 14 distinguishes an accusation from a demonstrated payment in greater detail. [S18]

In late August Old Style the Kornilov affair developed. The crisis between General Kornilov and Kerensky, troop movements towards Petrograd and their obstruction by mobilised opponents strengthened the left and weakened confidence in a right-wing solution to disorder. Siegelbaum’s overview also stresses ambiguities in the preceding communication; the intentions of all parties cannot be compressed into one simple sentence. [S06]

For our argument, the sequence of altered opportunities matters. A party subjected to repression after one crisis can appear as a defender of the revolution in the next and gain political space. Its eventual victory should not be read as evidence of uninterrupted omnipotence from the beginning of the year.

The question of who provided money remains legitimate. It does not replace questions about governmental credibility, fear of military intervention and decisions by other parties. A theory that treats every defeat and every victory as identical evidence of a predetermined plan loses the ability to distinguish intended from unintended outcomes.

> *The outcome of 1917 was not already an accomplished fact in every month of that year.*

Sources / notes: S06, S18

07 / October: organised action and political support

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The Bolshevik Central Committee’s resolution of October 10/23, 1917 declared armed insurrection an urgent task. The accompanying vote records ten in favour and two against. This is a concrete organisational record of a decision, not merely a later image of a spontaneous crowd. The text also contains Lenin’s reasons, which must be read as a justification of strategy. [S08]

In Petrograd the Military Revolutionary Committee and control of strategic locations played crucial roles. The seizure of government was organised armed action, not a nationwide referendum. This does not mean it had no support among workers and soldiers. “Coup,” “insurrection” and “revolution” emphasise different levels of the process: the method of capturing office, action by armed groups, and a wider social transformation. [S07, S08]

One word should not substitute for explanation. Calling an event a revolution does not legitimise every subsequent measure. Calling it a coup does not establish that social crisis and support were absent. Planning, the course of events and the extent of a mandate need separate reconstruction.

Visual evidence also has a date. The published description of a mass re-enactment of the attack on the Winter Palace concerns a performance in 1920, not the event of 1917 itself. RA07 therefore uses labelled editorial diagrams and existing atmospheric artwork, not illustrations presented as eyewitness testimony. [S35]

> *Organisation and social support are compatible; neither is an unlimited mandate.*

Sources / notes: S07, S08, S35

08 / Sovnarkom: read the actual government roster

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The decree of October 26/November 8 established the Council of People’s Commissars, or Sovnarkom, to administer the country until the Constituent Assembly convened. Its text assigned supervision and the right to remove commissars to the Congress of Soviets and its Central Executive Committee. This is the stated institutional form of the first government, not proof of flawless democratic practice. [S09]

Lenin was chairman. The document lists, among others, Rykov for internal affairs, Miliutin for agriculture, Shliapnikov for labour, Lunacharsky for education, Skvortsov-Stepanov for finance, Trotsky for foreign affairs and Stalin for nationalities. Military and naval affairs were assigned to a collective. This dated list of offices cannot be replaced by a later selection of famous names. [S09]

The source does not supply biological data about government members or a religious mandate from their ancestors. Public office and responsibility for decisions can be examined directly. To claim that an ethnic group controlled the government, it is not enough to select a few members by presumed origin and ignore the rest.

Government, the party’s central committee, a security agency and army command must also be distinguished. A roster from institution A cannot silently be presented as a roster from institution B. For any alleged percentage of representation, the date, offices, full denominator and classification method must be known. Even a correctly calculated proportion is not proof of collective loyalty or guilt.

> *A dated roster of offices is better evidence than a political collage of surnames.*

Sources / notes: S09

09 / Peace and land: promise, rule and implementation

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The Decree on Peace proposed negotiations to end the war without annexations or indemnities. It addressed governments as well as peoples and announced an intention to publish secret treaties. The proposal did not describe a peace already achieved: further negotiations and their result remained open. [S10]

The land decree of the same revolutionary period abolished landlord ownership without compensation and placed property under local land committees and peasant soviets. It included a peasant mandate compiled from 242 local submissions and repeatedly referred to the future Constituent Assembly. The text thus combined immediate expropriation with a declared future decision-making process. [S11]

These documents explain why 1917 cannot be described only through the names of leaders and bankers. They proposed changes affecting soldiers at the front, peasants and landowners. The support a proposal attracted is a different question from whether it was just towards every person affected. Political appeal and ethical evaluation are not the same variable.

Nor should a legal norm be treated as an accomplished result. A decree can establish what was commanded and to whom. Determining who actually obtained land, who suffered violence and how local administration operated would require further regional investigation. This study does not pretend to provide a countrywide inventory of land transfers. Equally, it does not confuse the November peace programme with the terms of the March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

> *A declared programme is not yet a peace treaty or a local outcome.*

Sources / notes: S10, S11, S25

10 / Elections and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

Elections to the Constituent Assembly began on November 12/25, 1917. The overview used here reports approximately 42 million votes, about 24% of them for the Bolsheviks. This is a rounded share of votes cast, not of all inhabitants, nor a simple measure of support in every city and military unit. SR and related lists were strong, although internal division complicated interpretation of their mandate. [S12]

The Assembly met on January 5/18, 1918. Its subsequent dissolution was justified partly by arguing that older candidate lists did not reflect the new division of political forces, and by asserting the superiority of Soviet power. These are explicit arguments advanced by the Bolshevik authorities, not independent evidence that all voters consented to suppressing an elected body. [S12, S13]

The distinction between mandates should not be erased. A majority in a particular soviet, congress or armed garrison is not automatically a nationwide electoral majority. Conversely, an aggregate election result alone does not describe who controlled administration and armed forces at a given moment.

The publicly documented dissolution is a serious fact about the narrowing of political competition. An unproven ethnic motive need not be added to criticise the disruption of representation. Precisely identifying the deciding institution and its argument gives criticism a firmer basis than a general label about the leaders’ origins.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · NOT NEW EMPIRICAL DATA

Support in a city	A soviet mandate	Votes nationwide

Different units of comparison: do not treat them as one majority.

> *Military predominance, a Soviet mandate and an electoral majority are not identical.*

Sources / notes: S12, S13

11 / Banks and state debts: what the regime actually ordered

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The bank nationalisation decree of December 14/27, 1917 declared banking a state monopoly and ordered private banks merged with the State Bank. It envisaged taking over assets and liabilities and declared protection for small depositors. The source establishes a legal transformation of ownership and control, not automatically effective protection of every deposit. [S14]

Another decree, dated January 21/February 3, 1918, annulled state loans of the previous governments and explicitly cancelled foreign loans without exception. It made separate provisions for certain domestic obligations, small holders and savings banks. Reducing the entire text to a claim that every private obligation of every kind immediately ceased to exist would therefore be inaccurate. [S15]

For the thesis of rule by private bankers, these measures are an uncomfortable but necessary test. Anyone claiming that the original creditors continued to direct everything must explain a specific mechanism of control despite the cancellation of their claims. It is insufficient to reply that every apparent loss is really a perfect disguise for profit.

The opposite extreme would also be mistaken. Nationalisation does not rule out secret payments, corruption, subsequent commercial agreements or foreign influence. The document changes what must be demonstrated: a general claim about finance must become a precise transaction, right, person and date. State financial policy and individual economic advantage should not be treated as the same question.

> *Nationalisation does not prove an absence of influence; it tests a claim of ownership-based control.*

Sources / notes: S14, S15

12 / Germany and the journey across its territory

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

Germany’s facilitation of Lenin’s return from Swiss exile across German territory in April 1917 is not a wholly invented connection. Russia’s military enemy had an interest in weakening its capacity to continue the war. Historian Gerd Koenen connects logistical assistance with that strategy and cites contemporary German reports of the successful return. [S17]

The journey alone does not establish the entire political relationship. Transport assistance is one form of support; funding is another; the right to issue and enforce specific political commands is a stronger claim still. A German official could assess Lenin’s activity as beneficial to Germany without thereby creating a signed commitment by Lenin to obey every German instruction.

Lenin’s published programme rejected support for the Provisional Government and continuation of war within its existing political framework. This permits identification of converging objectives without inventing a shared ultimate purpose. Imperial power sought to weaken an opponent; the Bolshevik programme sought revolutionary political change. Convergence on one issue is not identity of ideologies. [S04, S17]

Two convenient shortcuts must therefore be rejected. It is not honest to dismiss every indication of German assistance as propaganda. Nor is it honest to derive complete authorship of the revolution, or the ethnic identity of its supposed authors, from one border crossing. Evidence is valid for a specific kind of action, not automatically for every subsequent allegation.



> *Facilitating travel is a documented relationship, not by itself a complete contract of control.*

Sources / notes: S04, S17

13 / Kühlmann’s memorandum: strong evidence with a defined reach

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

In a memorandum of December 3, 1917, reproduced by Koenen with an archival reference, German State Secretary Richard von Kühlmann linked continuing support through various channels to the expansion of Bolshevik publishing and political reach. He also discussed exploiting their uncertain tenure to obtain peace. This is a specific contemporary acknowledgement of German support, not merely an inference from overlapping interests. [S17]

Access to the record must be described precisely: we read its reproduction in a historian’s article, not the autograph in the German Foreign Office Political Archive. The cited reference permits further checking. The article is a research intermediary; this volume does not pretend to conduct a new archival authentication.

The document has considerable evidential value for whether the German side supported Bolshevik activity. It does not have equal force for the exact total received by the party treasury, every commercial intermediary or the proportion of eventual success attributable to foreign assistance. A complete matching of German expenditure with Russian receipts is absent here.

An official’s claim of success is itself a statement to analyse. If he credits assistance with decisive effects, his assertion does not eliminate other causes. Our assessment is therefore that German support cannot simply be denied, while complete external control and a precise financial balance are not established by this record alone. Both propositions can hold at the same time.

> *The existence of support, its amount and complete control are three different claims.*

Sources / notes: S17

14 / Parvus, Ganetsky, Sumenson: an accusation is not an audit

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The July accusations connected Bolsheviks with Alexander Helphand, known as Parvus, Yakub Ganetsky and Evgeniia Sumenson. The published prosecutorial text uses commercial relationships, telegrams, accounts and witness statements. It also cites sums of money, but their appearance in an accusation does not by itself establish the origin, political purpose or ultimate recipient of every payment. [S18]

A sound test needs separate answers to several questions: did an account exist; was money transferred; was it payment for goods, a private transaction or a state subsidy; who had authority over it; and did the political organisation receive the amount? Currency conversion, intermediaries and ordinary commerce can complicate the route. These are neither automatic excuses nor automatic evidence of concealment.

Lyandres's 1995 monograph is a relevant scholarly investigation of these accusations. Its abstract and bibliographic record were available during preparation, but the large PDF could not be retrieved. We therefore do not attribute a specific final verdict to the book by guessing from its abstract. [S19]

Establishing general German support does not remove a historian's obligation to examine a particular channel. Conversely, refuting one channel would not automatically erase other evidence of support. The limitation of this first edition is openly acknowledged: we have not audited all accounts and telegrams. Names and arrows in a theory are replaced by questions that such an audit would need to answer.



> *Origin, purpose, authority over funds and the final recipient require separate verification.*

Sources / notes: S17, S18, S19

15 / The Sisson Documents: a real telegram about false evidence

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

In February 1918 American ambassador David R. Francis sent Washington a report on materials that he and Edgar Sisson considered evidence of German-Bolshevik connections. Yet the covering telegram acknowledged that most originals or photographs were not in their possession and requested further checking. Francis distinguished acquiring purported originals from establishing their authenticity. [S20]

Later research by Hamilton and Georgacopoulos identifies the Sisson Documents, in its available abstract, as fabricated materials circulated by the American government. The complete article was not available here, so we do not pretend to reproduce its full forensic demonstration. The abstract identifies the nature of the case; details of each forgery would require the full investigation. [S21]

A crucial distinction follows: an authentic diplomatic telegram may authentically record a diplomat’s belief in an inauthentic enclosure. Inclusion in the official FRUS edition establishes the existence and wording of diplomatic communication, not the authenticity of every document discussed within it. “It is in an American government archive” is therefore insufficient.

Nor can the case justify the reverse generalisation. If the Sisson materials are forged, it does not follow that every German record about supporting the Bolsheviks is forged. Kühlmann’s memorandum and the Sisson collection have different provenance and must be assessed separately. Source criticism cannot mean selecting only those doubts that protect a preferred conclusion.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · NOT NEW EMPIRICAL DATA



An authentic covering record does not automatically authenticate an enclosure.

> *Authenticity of a covering report does not automatically authenticate its enclosures.*

Sources / notes: S17, S20, S21

16 / Schiff and the April telegram: which government was supported?

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

Telegram 1321, sent by Secretary Lansing to Ambassador Francis on April 16, 1917, contains a message for Miliukov or Baron Gunzburg. Its signatories—Marshall, Morgenthau, Schiff, Strauss and Rosenwald—oppose a separate peace between Russia and the Central Powers and support the existing democratic government. This was the Provisional Government, not the Bolshevik cabinet, which did not yet exist. [S22]

The short source is especially useful because date, addressee and content can be checked together. Extracting the words about readiness to cooperate while omitting opposition to a separate peace would reverse the message's political meaning. This finding does not establish the correctness of every political decision by the signatories.

Roberts's research distinguishes Schiff's support for the Provisional Government from his subsequent opposition to the Bolsheviks. It also describes support for anti-Bolshevik publicity and increasing concern over anti-Jewish violence by White forces. These findings are used as the author's research into correspondence, not as our own inspection of every bank account. [S23]

Every financial or political connection with "Russia after the revolution" cannot therefore be treated as the same thing. A loan to the Provisional Government, humanitarian relief, anti-Bolshevik propaganda and later commerce with Soviet bodies are different activities. A document may establish one without establishing the others. No single letter constitutes a complete audit of a firm; a concrete contrary document nevertheless cannot simply be ignored.

> *Support for a revolution against the tsar is not automatically support for the Bolsheviks.*

Sources / notes: S22, S23

17 / 1917 and Balfour: coincidence is not common command

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The Balfour Declaration is a British letter dated November 2, 1917. The October seizure of power in Petrograd falls on November 7 in the Gregorian calendar. The proximity of the dates is real; it is not by itself evidence that one organisation directed both events. The documents have different authors, addressees, legal settings and immediate objectives. [S07, S34]

Beter and the later digest connect them within a larger account of common origins for Bolshevism and Zionism. Those texts document the existence of that interpretation. To verify it historically would require a specific decision-making relationship between British actors, banking interests and the Russian revolutionary organisation. The calendar alone contains no such relationship. [S31–S34]

War created international opportunities, but different parties could exploit them for different reasons. Occasional contact or a common opponent does not automatically unify political programmes. The April telegram bearing Schiff’s signature, for example, opposed a separate peace, whereas the Bolshevik government later moved towards leaving the war. Such differences must remain visible. [S22, S25]

RA07 does not attempt to redo the whole history of Zionism, which belongs in RA05. Here we test a specific logical bridge. We need a record of action at either end and evidence of a connection between them. Without the second step, we have two events side by side, not a demonstrated common operation.

> *The same year is neither a financial trail nor an organisational order.*

Sources / notes: S07, S22, S25, S31, S32, S33, S34

18 / Brest-Litovsk: peace did not mean equality of partners

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The treaty of March 3, 1918 ended the state of war between Russia and the Central Powers. Its published text imposed major territorial and military obligations on Russia, including withdrawal from extensive areas and demobilisation. This is a concrete negotiating outcome, distinct from the general peace programme of November. [S10, S25]

The treaty also demonstrates the importance of asymmetry. A military power obtaining favourable terms from a weaker partner does not by itself prove secret control; it can involve overt military coercion and a narrowed range of choices. Pressure from circumstances does not, however, eliminate a government’s responsibility for its choice and consequences.

The examined text names Ukraine, Finland and other territories separately. Describing the entire former empire as one homogeneous population without its own political conflicts would therefore be inaccurate. Treaty recognition, local consent and actual territorial control are also different matters. [S25]

For the thesis of German support, Brest is an important outcome, not a retrospective receipt for every alleged payment in 1917. Causal analysis must still distinguish assistance before the seizure of power, later pressure and obligations accepted. Supplementary economic agreements and internal disputes remain avenues for further research. This source-based case study does not pretend to reconstruct every peace negotiation.

> *Military pressure, cooperation and an earlier subsidy are not one item of evidence.*

Sources / notes: S10, S25

19 / Cheka and Red Terror: repression need not be invented

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The founding Cheka document of December 1917 established an extraordinary commission attached to Sovnarkom to combat counter-revolution and sabotage. The published extract lists surveillance of the press, strikers and right SRs, and measures including detention and deprivation of food cards. The initial mandate and later expansion of practice must be distinguished. [S26]

The Red Terror resolution of September 5, 1918 explicitly prescribes repressive policy: isolation of class enemies in camps and executions of people associated with White Guard organisations or conspiracies. These formulations should not be dismissed as a later anti-Bolshevik fantasy. They are public evidence of the government’s own policy. [S27]

Objectivity here should not mean moral emptiness. Imprisoning and killing people under broadly formulated categories threatens individual responsibility and the possibility of defence. This is our explicitly stated ethical evaluation, not the resolution’s authors’ own self-description.

Precision matters equally when counting consequences. One decree is not a complete list of executions, deaths in detention, war losses or victims of hunger. A total requires defined categories and records from particular areas. Acknowledging real repression does not authorise attaching an arbitrary number or transferring responsibility from decision-making bodies to everyone of the same ancestry.

> *A documented repressive order is a serious fact, but not an unlimited victim total.*

Sources / notes: S26, S27

20 / Civil war and external intervention

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

Wartime disintegration and the struggle for power did not end with the announcement of a new government. Brest's territorial obligations, security measures and foreign proposals for military action document several parallel conflicts. A diagram of two eternal camps cannot capture the difference between a local group, a government and a temporary foreign ally. [S25–S27, S36]

The American aide-mémoire of July 17, 1918 explicitly rejected large-scale intervention as a suitable solution, while admitting limited military tasks: assistance to Czechoslovak forces, protection of stores and certain forms of support for self-defence. The United States did not declare that the same restrictions bound every ally. This is a statement of policy, not proof that every subsequent military act matched it precisely. [S36]

For Slovak readers the Czechoslovak connection matters, but a history of the legions would merit a separate study. Here we document its presence in a specific American policy text. We do not reconstruct the entire course of Siberian operations from one diplomatic memorandum.

Foreign assistance is therefore examined within a consistent framework: who, when, to whom and with what limitations? Assistance to the Bolsheviks and to their opponents each had objectives and risks. This framework does not automatically assign equal blame to every side. It permits responsibility to be attached to a particular decision rather than portraying war as the mechanical execution of one ethnic or financial plan.

> *Foreign actor is not a uniform category; even allies imposed different limits.*

Sources / notes: S25, S26, S27, S36

21 / Religious freedom and attacks on institutions

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The decree on freedom of conscience, dated February 1918 in the edition used, separated church and state and declared the freedom to profess a religion or none. At the same time it deprived religious societies of legal personality and ownership rights and declared their property to belong to the people. Conditional use of worship buildings was not restoration of ownership. [S28]

These provisions must be read together. Selecting only freedom of belief would conceal a fundamental attack on the institutional existence of religious communities. Selecting only expropriation and claiming the document literally prohibited all private faith would also misrepresent its wording. Rights, restrictions and actual practice form three distinct levels of investigation.

The text concerns religious societies generally, not only one category of people defined by ancestry. Actual persecution of Christians and members of other religions should not be concealed. Documenting it nevertheless requires specific decisions, affected individuals and local testimony; one legal text cannot establish all victim totals in subsequent decades. [S28]

For assessing Beter’s explanation, the decisive distinction is between anti-religious state policy and an allegation of inherited ethnic hatred. The first has its own documents and institutions. The second requires different evidence, which cannot be replaced by the victims’ religion or an official’s presumed ancestry. Individual and institutional responsibility remains specific.

> *Examine legal restrictions directly; do not replace their explanation with hereditary guilt.*

Sources / notes: S28, S31

22 / Pogroms: a red uniform was no guarantee of protection

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

Lenin’s March 1919 speech condemns anti-Jewish pogroms and the diversion of anger towards Jews as a group. It documents his public political position. It does not establish that every armed man claiming allegiance to Soviet power acted accordingly. [S29]

McGeever’s research on Uman also identifies anti-Jewish violence by members of Soviet units and problems within local institutions. It describes attacks by one unit and intervention by another that stopped the violence. The case contradicts a simple equation: a Bolshevik or Red designation did not by itself guarantee protection for Jewish inhabitants. [S30]

Attributing violence requires the date, place, particular unit and its allegiance at the time. Units could change sides and command might lack effective control. This does not mean perpetrators or failures to protect cease to exist. It means responsibility should not be inferred solely from a later aggregate label.

The idea of Jews collectively as the single creator of Bolshevism also overlooks Jewish opponents and victims of its rule. The reverse claim—that a declared internationalist ideology excludes antisemitism—fails as well. The research question therefore concerns actions: who gave orders, attacked, assisted, stayed silent and had the means to intervene? Rejecting collective indictment must not become an escape from concrete responsibility.

> *A speech against pogroms does not prove their absence.*

Sources / notes: S24, S29, S30

23 / Beter’s Bolshevism and the historical category

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

In AL50 of September 30, 1979, Beter attributes the Bolshevik Revolution to an alleged Khazar continuity and interprets subsequent mass killing through inherited hostility to Christianity. He gives figures exceeding one hundred million Christians and twenty million religious Jews. These are his assertions, not totals established by this study; the relevant passage supplies no reproducible demographic calculation. [S31]

Such sums cannot enter a historical balance simply because they were stated confidently. A precise period, territory, victim definition and evidenced method for assigning religion are missing. RA07 therefore assesses them as unsupported and does not use them as reliable totals. The existence of genuine repression cannot establish their precise magnitude. [S26–S28, S31]

AL67 of August 1981 distinguishes ordinary American Jews from groups the author calls Zionist and Bolshevik leadership, while attributing a common aim of worldwide domination to those groups. Both layers must be acknowledged: distinctions exist in his language, but do not establish the alleged coordination. The later Bird’s-Eye View of 1983 is also not verbatim identical with an original recording. [S32, S33]

In Beter’s narrative “Bolshevik” additionally labels an alleged power faction of the 1970s and 1980s. In the history of 1917 we use the term for a specific political organisation and its decisions. Without separating those meanings, a later theory would silently become the definition of an earlier event.

> *An author’s factional label is not itself a historical identification.*

Sources / notes: S26, S27, S28, S31, S32, S33

24 / Conclusion: multiple causes, specific responsibility

CONTEMPORARY SOURCES / HISTORICAL CONTEXT / EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The sources support distinguishing February's fall of the monarchy, October's seizure of power and the institutional transformation that followed. An organised decision for armed action, land measures, bank nationalisation, dissolution of a parliamentary body and repressive orders are specifically documented. This is not merely a dispute between later labels. [S01, S08–S15, S26–S28]

It is equally wrong to dismiss German support as pure invention. Its contemporary acknowledgement carries evidential weight. The precise balance of every channel and complete external control are stronger questions, however. Sisson forgeries cannot serve as authentic accounting, and Schiff's support for the Provisional Government cannot be moved into the later Bolshevik period. [S17–S23]

An explanation based on the supposed inherited will of an entire ethnic group cannot reach its conclusion from the records without unproven steps. It lacks a specific organisation of continuity, a traceable chain of decisions and a reliable way to distinguish dissenting actors. Jewish revolutionaries, anti-Bolshevik Jews and Jewish victims must all be examined without denying the identity of any of these groups. [S09, S22–S24, S29–S32]

Our concluding explanation is an analytical diagram, not a new mathematical model: social crisis creates opportunities; organisation can exploit them; outside assistance can expand capacity; political decisions and violence shape the outcome. The magnitude of each effect cannot be determined from one telegram. RA07 thus offers a source-based entry into the problem, not a final account of every aspect of the revolution.

Further verification has specific targets: complete financial files, regional election results, local repression and full scholarly works unavailable to this edition. These gaps are not covered with new certainty. Nor are they used to erase decisions and actions that sources already establish.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · NOT NEW EMPIRICAL DATA

Analytical categories, not measured shares of causation.

> *Precision does not dilute responsibility; it identifies who bears it and for what.*

Sources / notes: S01, S08, S09, S10, S11, S12, S13, S14, S15, S17, S18, S19, S20, S21, S22, S23, S24, S26, S27, S28, S29, S30, S31, S32

People and institutions: distinctions

Person or body	Role in the sources used	Source
Mikuláš II. / Nicholas II	Monarch at the March abdication; not head of the October Provisional Government.	S01
Alexander Kerenskij / Alexander Kerensky	Provisional Government leader; opponent of the Bolshevik seizure of power.	S06–S07
V. I. Lenin	Author of the April Theses, chairman of the first Sovnarkom.	S04, S09
Lev Trockij / Leon Trotsky	Commissar for foreign affairs in the first government roster.	S09
Richard von Kühlmann	German State Secretary; record of support and a peace opportunity.	S17
Parvus / Helphand; Ganetskij / Ganetsky; Sumensonová / Sumenson	Names in the dispute over financial channels; accusation is not a full audit.	S18–S19
Jacob Schiff	Signatory of the April telegram; political positions require dates.	S22–S23
David R. Francis; Edgar Sisson	Participants in the disputed-documents episode; distinguish report from enclosures.	S20–S21
Soviet / Sovnarkom / Čeka	Council / government / security commission: not synonyms.	S03, S09, S26

This list identifies roles, not complete biographies, genealogies or all political positions.

Claim register / C01–C05

C01 · Lenin overthrew the tsar in October.

Contradicted by chronology

Abdication belongs to March NS; the October action targeted the Provisional Government.

[S01, S07]

C02 · Every soviet was Bolshevik from the outset.

Contradicted by a contemporary programme

The April Theses acknowledge the Bolsheviks’ minority position in many councils.

[S04]

C03 · The Bolsheviks won a nationwide electoral majority.

Contradicted by the overview used

About 24% of votes cast for the Constituent Assembly is not a majority.

[S12, S13]

C04 · German support is entirely invented.

Refuted by available evidence

Logistical assistance and Kühlmann’s acknowledgement have specific documentary support.

[S17]

C05 · The full balance and every financial channel are known.

Not established in this edition

We do not have a complete matching of expenditure, bank transfers and party receipts.

[S18, S19]

Claim register / C06–C10

C06 · The Sisson collection is authentic conspiracy accounting.

Invalid evidential basis

The collection is identified as fabricated; an authentic covering telegram does not authenticate it.

[S20, S21]

C07 · Schiff’s April telegram supported a Bolshevik government.

Contradicted by wording and date

It supports the Provisional Government and opposes a separate peace with the Central Powers.

[S22, S23]

C08 · Red Terror is only hostile propaganda.

Contradicted by a government source

The September 5, 1918 resolution explicitly prescribes repressive measures.

[S26, S27]

C09 · Lenin’s condemnation proves that Red units committed no pogroms.

Invalid inference

A speech and unit conduct are different evidence; the Uman case shows a contradiction.

[S29, S30]

C10 · Documents establish Beter’s hereditary axis and victim totals.

Unsupported in the examined framework

Demonstrated organisational continuity and a reproducible demographic balance are missing.

[S31, S32, S33]

Chronology / 1

Date	Event	Source
23 Feb. / 8 Mar. 1917	Opening mass protests in Petrograd.	S02
1 / 14 Mar. 1917	Petrograd Soviet Order No. I.	S03
2 / 15 Mar. 1917	Abdication of Nicholas II.	S01
16 Apr. 1917 NS	Lansing transmits the message bearing Schiff’s signature.	S22
4 / 17 Apr. 1917	Lenin’s April Theses.	S04
22 Jul. / 4 Aug. 1917	Publication of the prosecutorial accusation used.	S18
Aug. / Sep. 1917	Kornilov affair; months OS / NS.	S06
10 / 23 Oct. 1917	Central Committee decision on insurrection.	S08
2 Nov. 1917 NS	Balfour Declaration in Britain.	S34
25 Oct. / 7 Nov. 1917	Seizure of power in Petrograd.	S07
26 Oct. / 8 Nov. 1917	Sovnarkom, peace and land decrees.	S09–S11

OS = Old Style (Julian); NS = New Style (Gregorian). Paired dates are OS / NS. Events follow NS order; broader periods retain uncertainty.

Chronology / 2

Date	Event	Source
12 / 25 Nov. 1917	Constituent Assembly elections begin.	S12
3 Dec. 1917 NS	Kühlmann memorandum on support.	S17
7 / 20 Dec. 1917	Establishment of the Cheka.	S26
14 / 27 Dec. 1917	Nationalisation of banks.	S14
6 / 19 Jan. 1918	Decree dissolving the Constituent Assembly.	S13
21 Jan. / 3 Feb. 1918	Annulment of state loans.	S15
3 Mar. 1918 NS	Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.	S25
17 Jul. 1918 NS	American aide-mémoire on military action.	S36
5 Sep. 1918 NS	Red Terror resolution.	S27
Mar. 1919	Lenin’s anti-pogrom speech; a different type of evidence from reports of violence.	S29–S30
1979 / 1981 / 1983	AL50, AL67 and the later digest.	S31–S33

OS = Old Style (Julian); NS = New Style (Gregorian). Paired dates are OS / NS. Events follow NS order; broader periods retain uncertainty.

Glossary

Term	Meaning in this study
OS / NS	Old Julian / New Gregorian Style; a 13-day difference for 1917. [S16]
Soviet	Council; the word alone does not identify party composition. [S03–S05]
Sovnarkom	Council of People’s Commissars, a governmental body; not all soviets combined. [S09]
Čeka / Cheka	Extraordinary commission for combating counter-revolution and sabotage. [S26]
Eseri / SRs	Socialist Revolutionaries; internal division matters for elections and policy. [S12–S13]
Subvencia / Subsidy	Purpose-related financial support; it does not automatically confer control over the recipient.
Proveniencia / Provenance	The origin and custodial history of a document, including intermediaries and editions.
Autentický / Authentic	A document is what it purports to be; its content may nevertheless contain error or falsehood.
Kolektívna vina / Collective guilt	Assigning responsibility merely through membership in an ethnic or religious category.
Judeoboľševizmus / Judeo-Bolshevism	A narrative identifying Bolshevism with a collective Jewish conspiracy, not a neutral membership category. [S24, S29–S32]

Reader’s procedure and publication details

For a new claim, identify date, institution and the precise action. Then distinguish a document from its content: a real report can record a false accusation. For money, seek the recipient, purpose and matching record; for violence, the specific order, perpetrators, victims and limits of the evidence.

Compare contrary findings. One refusal of assistance is not a full financial audit, but neither is it nothing. One documented subsidy is not complete control, but neither is it nothing. A conclusion must preserve both the actual strength and the actual limits of evidence.

Related volumes: RA05 examines currents of Zionism; RA06 specific Rothschild financial relationships; RA08 Palestine and Israel’s creation; RA11 will bring findings together to test Beter’s theory. No future volume is automatically further confirmation of this study.

RA07, version 1.0. Editorial and source cut-off: October 11, 2026. Independent AI-assisted publication prepared for reader review, without external academic peer review. Complete study means the full text of this edition, not exhaustive coverage of revolutionary history.

Graphics: the atmospheric archive-desk image is reused from the approved RA06 series; it is neither a period photograph nor a reconstruction of a 1917 meeting. New didactic diagrams are editorial aids. PDF, HTML and TXT share the same text and references; the illustrated edition is deliberately condensed.

Prepared for the archive: www.peterdavidbeter.com · Me & Zen · Colombine Michelangelo. Tempus omnia revelat.

Sources / S01–S05

S01 · Abdication Manifesto

Nicholas II; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 2/15 March 1917

Primary / translated · Manifesto; Golder (1927), pp. 297–298

Access and scope: Available English translation read, not the manuscript. March 2 is Old Style.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/february-revolution/february-revolution-texts/abdication-manifesto/

S02 · February Revolution

Lewis Siegelbaum; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · Undated web essay

Historical essay · Complete short essay

Access and scope: Short scholarly context used; not a separate inventory of all February events.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/february-revolution/

S03 · Order No. I

Petrograd Soviet; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 1/14 March 1917

Primary / translated · Order, clauses 1–7

Access and scope: Available translation read. Its addressees and qualifications must not be omitted.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/revolution-in-the-army/revolution-in-the-army-texts/order-no-i/

S04 · The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution (April Theses)

V. I. Lenin; Marxists Internet Archive · 4/17 April 1917

Primary / translated · Theses 1–10

Access and scope: Available English text read. The author’s programme is distinguished from implemented policy.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/04.htm

S05 · The Dual Power

V. I. Lenin; Marxists Internet Archive · 9/22 April 1917

Primary / translated · Complete article

Access and scope: Lenin’s own interpretation of dual power, not a neutral account of every party’s position.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/09.htm

Sources / S06–S10

S06 · Kornilov Affair

Lewis Siegelbaum; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · Undated web essay

Historical essay · Complete short essay

Access and scope: Concise reconstruction of the crisis and its consequences; no claim to examine all correspondence.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/kornilov-affair/

S07 · Bolsheviks Seize Power

Lewis Siegelbaum; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · Undated web essay

Historical essay · Complete short essay

Access and scope: Context for the October seizure of power and the interpretive debate.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/bolsheviks-seize-power/

S08 · Central Committee Decides on Armed Uprising

Bolshevik Central Committee; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 10/23 October 1917

Primary / translated · Resolution and vote

Access and scope: Published resolution and recorded 10–2 vote read; not the original complete minutes.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/bolsheviks-seize-power/bolsheviks-seize-power-texts/central-committee-decides-on-armed-uprising/

S09 · Soviet of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom)

Second Congress of Soviets; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 26 October / 8 November 1917

Primary / translated · Formation decree and roster

Access and scope: Source for membership and the government’s stated mandate; not a genetic register of its members.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/first-bolshevik-decrees/first-bolshevik-decrees-texts/soviet-of-peoples-commissars-sovnarkom/

S10 · Decree on Peace

Second Congress of Soviets; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 26 October / 8 November 1917

Primary / translated · Published decree

Access and scope: Available peace proposal read; distinguished from the later treaty.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/treaty-of-brest-litovsk/treaty-of-brest-litovsk-texts/decree-on-peace/

Sources / S11–S15

S11 · Decree on the Land

Second Congress of Soviets; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 26 October / 8 November 1917

Primary / translated · Decree and peasant mandate

Access and scope: Text read, including its reference to 242 local mandates. No new land audit.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/peasant-revolution/peasant-revolution-texts/decree-on-the-land/

S12 · Constituent Assembly

Lewis Siegelbaum; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · Undated web essay

Historical essay · Election overview and dissolution

Access and scope: About 24% of votes for the Bolsheviks is this synthesis’s figure. No new electoral tabulation was conducted.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/constituent-assembly/

S13 · Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly

All-Russian Central Executive Committee; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 6/19 January 1918

Primary / translated · Published decree

Access and scope: The government’s justification for dissolution, not evidence of all voters’ consent.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/constituent-assembly/constituent-assembly-texts/dissolution-of-the-constituent-assembly/

S14 · Nationalization of Banks

All-Russian Central Executive Committee; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 14/27 December 1917

Primary / translated · Clauses on monopoly, merger and deposits

Access and scope: Published rule read; not evidence of flawless implementation.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/economic-apparatus/economic-apparatus-texts/nationalization-of-banks/

S15 · First Decrees of Soviet Power: Annulment of State Loans

Yuri Akhapkin, ed.; Lawrence & Wishart · 1970 edition; decree 21 January / 3 February 1918

Primary / edited translation · Document 36, printed pp. 90–91; PDF pages 89–90

Access and scope: Selected decree read; first page checked visually as well. The whole collection is not analysed.

https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/1917/firstdecreesofsovietpower.pdf

Sources / S16–S20

S16 · Introduction of a New Calendar

Council of People’s Commissars; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 24 January / 6 February 1918 (edition heading)

Primary / translated · Clauses 1–10

Access and scope: The cited edition gives February 6. The crucial rule is that January 31 was followed by February 14.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/new-letters-and-dates/new-letters-and-dates-texts/introduction-of-a-new-calendar/

S17 · Spiel um Weltmacht. Deutschland und die Russische Revolution

Gerd Koenen; Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte / bpb · 18 August 2017

Historical research / reproduced primary · Sealed train; Kühlmann memorandum, 3 Dec. 1917; note 10

Access and scope: Article and its reproduced German record read. The PA-AA autograph was not inspected. Author’s reference: Deutschland Nr. 131, Geh., Bd. 18, Bl. 112ff.

https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/254460/spiel-um-weltmacht-deutschland-und-die-russische-revolution/

S18 · Charges against the Bolsheviks

Petrograd prosecutorial account; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 22 July / 4 August 1917 (source publication)

Primary / accusation · Novaia Zhizn’; Browder & Kerensky (1961), pp. 1373–1376

Access and scope: Accusation read. Account and witness details are claims in this source, not payments independently verified here.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/july-days/july-days-texts/charges-against-the-bolsheviks/

S19 · The Bolsheviks’ “German Gold” Revisited: An Inquiry into the 1917 Accusations

Semion Lyandres; Carl Beck Papers 1106 · 1995

Research / abstract only · Abstract and bibliographic record

Access and scope: Abstract and bibliographic record available. The large PDF could not be retrieved; conclusions of the full monograph are not inferred from its abstract.

https://carlbeckpapers.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/cbp/article/view/63

S20 · Francis to the Secretary of State, telegram 2354

U.S. Department of State, FRUS 1918, Russia, vol. I · 9–13 February 1918

Primary / diplomatic report · Document 371, opening paragraphs and purported enclosures

Access and scope: Covering telegram read; its reservations are distinguished from the purported evidence in its enclosures.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Russiav01/d371

Sources / S21–S25

S21 · The Sisson Documents and their “distinguished place” in the history of disinformation

John Maxwell Hamilton & Christina Georgacopoulos · 2021

Research / abstract only · Intelligence and National Security 36(6), pp. 881–897; DOI 10.1080/02684527.2021.1946953

Access and scope: Available abstract explicitly identifies fabricated documents. The full article and its complete forensic discussion were not available here.

https://repository.lsu.edu/manship_pubs/102/

S22 · The Secretary of State to Ambassador Francis, telegram 1321

U.S. Department of State, FRUS 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I · 16 April 1917

Primary / diplomatic record · Document 35; file 763.72119/563a

Access and scope: Whole short telegram read: five signatories, support for the Provisional Government, opposition to a separate peace.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1917Supp02v01/d35

S23 · Jewish Bankers, Russia, and the Soviet Union, 1900–1940: The Case of Kuhn, Loeb and Company

Priscilla Roberts · American Jewish Archives Journal 49(1–2), 1997, pp. 9–37

Historical research / author-posted text · Sections on 1917–1920 and accompanying notes

Access and scope: Author-posted electronic text and notes read; originals of all cited Schiff letters were not checked.

https://www.academia.edu/31625508/_Jewish_Bankers_Russia_and_the_Soviet_Union_1900_1940_The_Case_of_Kuhn_Loeb_and_Company_American_Jewish_Archives_Journal_49_1_2_1997_9_37

S24 · Bund Archives, RG 1400

YIVO Archives · Collection guide

Archival finding aid · Historical note and collection description

Access and scope: Historical collection description used; not unread individual minutes or every position of the movement.

https://yivoarchives.yivo.org/index.php?id=33762&p=collections/controlcard

S25 · Treaty of Brest Litovsk

Russia and the Central Powers; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 3 March 1918

Primary / translated extract · Published articles 1–13

Access and scope: Web extract read; appendices and all supplementary treaties are not comprehensively analysed.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/treaty-of-brest-litovsk/treaty-of-brest-litovsk-texts/treaty-of-brest-litovsk/

Sources / S26–S30

S26 · Establishment of the Cheka

Council of People’s Commissars; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 7/20 December 1917

Primary / later published extract · Published founding instructions

Access and scope: Available translation of a later-published extract, not the complete Cheka archive.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/state-security/state-security-texts/establishment-of-the-extraordinary-commission-to-fight-counter-revolution/

S27 · Resolution on Red Terror

Council of People’s Commissars; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 5 September 1918

Primary / translated · Published resolution

Access and scope: Provisions on terror, confinement in camps and executions read; not a complete list of victims.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/state-security/state-security-texts/resolution-on-red-terror/

S28 · Freedom of Religious Conscience

Council of People’s Commissars; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 2 February 1918 (edition heading)

Primary / translated · Clauses 1–13; Decrees, vol. I, pp. 373–374

Access and scope: Date follows the used edition’s heading; drafting, adoption and publication dates are not conflated. Rights and property restrictions both read.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/conflict-with-the-church/conflict-with-the-church-texts/decree-on-the-freedom-of-conscience-and-on-clerical-and-religious-societies/

S29 · Anti-Jewish Pogroms

V. I. Lenin; Marxists Internet Archive · Recorded March 1919

Primary / translated speech · Complete short text

Access and scope: Speech transcript read, not a new audio verification. A speech is not proof of compliance by all units.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/mar/x10.htm

S30 · Red Antisemitism: Anti-Jewish Violence and Revolutionary Politics in Ukraine, 1919

Brendan McGeever; Quest, no. 15 · 2019

Historical research · Especially Uman’; DOI 10.48248/issn.2037-741X/839

Access and scope: Article and source notes read. Its archival findings are attributed, not presented as our own archival investigation.

https://www.quest-cdecjournal.it/red-antisemitism-anti-jewish-violence-and-revolutionary-politics-in-ukraine-1919/

Sources / S31–S36

S31 · Audio Letter No. 50

Peter David Beter · 30 September 1979

Interpretive primary / transcript · Topic 3, especially the passage beginning “In 1917”

Access and scope: Transcript read: evidence of Beter’s claims, not automatic evidence of events. No new comparison with audio.

https://www.peterdavidbeter.com/docs/all/dbal50.html

S32 · Audio Letter No. 67

Peter David Beter · 25 August 1981

Interpretive primary / transcript · Topic 2, American Jews and alleged factional alliance

Access and scope: Transcript read; distinguishing ordinary Jews from alleged factions does not verify claims of global control.

https://www.peterdavidbeter.com/docs/all/dbal67.html

S33 · A Bird’s-Eye View of the Dr. Beter Audio Letter Series

Audio Books Inc.; Audio Letter Reference Digest · 1983

Later interpretive digest · Rothschild interests; Bolshevism and Zionism

Access and scope: Later summary distinguished from a verbatim Beter letter. Available web version read.

https://www.peterdavidbeter.com/docs/all/dbeye.html

S34 · Balfour Declaration

Arthur James Balfour; Avalon Project, Yale Law School · 2 November 1917

Primary / transcription · Complete letter

Access and scope: Used only for chronological and institutional distinction; fuller treatment belongs to RA05, RA06 and RA08.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfour.asp

S35 · Taking of the Winter Palace Re-enacted

Description of the 1920 spectacle; Seventeen Moments in Soviet History · 1920; retrospective staging

Primary / later reconstruction · Event description

Access and scope: Record of a later staging, not eyewitness evidence of the attack in 1917.

https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917/new-letters-and-dates/new-letters-and-dates-texts/taking-of-the-winter-palace-re-enacted/

S36 · The Secretary of State to the Allied Ambassadors: Aide-Mémoire

U.S. Department of State, FRUS 1918, Russia, vol. II · 17 July 1918

Primary / diplomatic policy · Document 345; file 861.00/3054b

Access and scope: Whole document read. Stated limits of intervention do not establish every subsequent military practice.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Russiav02/d345