RA09

GLOBAL POWER & “NEW WORLD ORDER”

Institutions, networks and the limits of evidence for control

COMPLETE SOURCE-BASED STUDY

A source-based comparison of public programmes, financial concentration and Beter’s claims.

Institutions · finance · networks · decision-making · Beter

Tempus omnia revelat.

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What this volume examines

RA09 examines selected public programmes, international institutions and mechanisms of financial or political influence. It follows questions raised by Beter without accepting his labels as a completed map of the world. It is neither an inventory of every organisation nor a complete history of international relations.

Four distinct problems are central: what a programme declares; which authority an institution possesses; what influence a financial or personal relationship permits; and what is documented about particular coordinated conduct. Jumping between them can turn real information into apparent proof of something else.

The time frame deliberately has several layers. Beter’s 1970s transcripts are compared with contemporary legislation and texts. Later programmes, regulatory documents, research and an audit are treated as separately dated cases. Later resemblance does not itself confirm an earlier prediction.

The text does not promise a complete audit of world finance, every lobbying contact or secret archives. It offers a procedure for identifying a document, a missing step and a conclusion’s limits in a specific claim. Criticism of concentrated power remains possible without positing a single joint headquarters.

Both language editions share their organisation and source identifiers. The complete study contains this edition’s entire editorial argument; the illustrated guide selects orienting themes. Its brevity must not strengthen conclusions beyond the full text.

> **Programme, authority, influence and executed instruction are four different evidentiary questions.**

Method, dates and limits of access

We distinguish a primary document, its later transcription, an institution’s self-description, original research and our analytical assessment. An organiser’s statement about its meeting documents its position; it is not automatically an independent review of every activity. The source register specifies access and use for each item.

Statutory provisions, forms and documents are read in the identified versions. The original UN Charter is not used for current voting totals. Accessible current rules follow the verified page; historical audits and studies are not presented as a new measurement of 2026. [S02, S06–S11, S26]

Beter’s AL09 and AL24 are available transcripts, not audio newly checked by us. Bird’s-Eye View is a later digest, not automatically Beter’s verbatim statement. The UNICEF packet lacks its announced enclosure and cannot verify that enclosure’s full wording. [S01, S03, S29, S30]

For The Crisis of Democracy, an electronic OCR transcript of the foreword and specified pages was accessible, rather than the complete PDF scan. For the Krause and Gilens/Page works, conclusions are limited to the accessible abstracts. No fresh analysis of raw ownership data, lobbying filings or fund votes was conducted. [S13, S20–S24, S31]

The numerical examples of 100 votes, 100 units of assets under management and a 60% × 60% chain are explicitly hypothetical. They explain distinct quantities rather than estimate any particular entity’s wealth or votes. A diagram is not new empirical evidence.

The source-access cut-off is 11 October 2026. Sources were not all created on that date; each carries its own date or an access date. Short Slovak explanations are editorial translations and paraphrases, not new official translations. The study is not personal legal or investment advice.

Sources / notes: S01, S02, S03, S06, S07, S08, S09, S10, S11, S13, S20, S21, S22, S23, S24, S26, S29, S30, S31

01 · Power is not a single relationship

When someone says that an organisation “controls the world”, the first task is not to draw a web of names. Define control: owning assets, selecting management, setting agendas, conditioning a loan, stopping a payment or enforcing a decision. This study uses these categories as its own working framework.

Concrete sources reveal the distinctions. Form 13F separates investment discretion from voting authority. The UN Charter assigns different functions to its organs. The OECD examines influence on public decisions through legal channels too. These are three research objects, not three names for a single owner. [S06, S20, S25]

The practical procedure begins with six entries: actor, decision object, authority or leverage, time, executed action and consequence. “A bank financed a state” remains incomplete until we know the contract, maturity, conditions and whether the borrower actually accepted the demand. Financial dependence can be serious without ownership of a country.

Influence is not insignificant because it is less than absolute. An organisation able to block one reform can harm many people without deciding every war or election. Conversely, citing an institution’s formal constitution does not absolve it: rules and actual practice are separate layers.

The following chapters therefore move from concepts to documents and only then to causal conclusions. An open question is not a blank into which a preferred name may automatically be inserted.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · SEE EXPLANATION

Four kinds of relationship; no automatic arrow between them.

> **Always specify the verb: who can do what, to whom, under which conditions.**

Sources / notes: S06, S20, S25

02 · The same words need not describe the same project

“New world order” can describe a changed balance of power, a normative programme for cooperation or an allegation of secret government. Without an author and date, the expression becomes a container for almost anything. What must be tested is a specific proposition.

The source set includes different initiatives: developing states’ economic demands in 1974, Bush’s 1990 speech and Schwab’s public 2020 article. They are not three editions of one document. Their sponsors, circumstances and instruments differ. [S04, S05, S17]

To compare them, we use the same fields: who proposes the programme, whom it is to bind, which institutions it requires and how it is to be implemented. A publicly expressed ambition may be democratic, paternalistic or authoritarian; publicity alone does not decide its moral quality.

Nor does similar vocabulary establish joint authorship. Two groups can demand a “fair order” while seeking opposite distributions of resources. Connecting evidence could include correspondence, a joint decision, a budget or an identifiable implementing body.

This chapter does not deny the possibility of long-term political projects. It sets a condition for recognising them: continuity must be demonstrated, not manufactured by repeated words. A historical account is more precise when it allows powerful actors to disagree.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · SEE EXPLANATION

Different authors, documents and political circumstances.

> **A label starts an inquiry; it does not supply a completed genealogy of power.**

Sources / notes: S04, S05, S17

03 · AL09: an event, a date and an attributed purpose

In the opening of Audio Letter 09, dated 16 February 1976, Beter connects the US fiscal-year change with a declaration of interdependence that he dates to Philadelphia on 24 October 1975. He interprets the October fiscal-year start as commemorating it. This is a specific, testable causal allegation. [S01]

At least three questions must be separated: whether a public initiative existed; when and through which legal act the calendar changed; and who documented the claimed motive. Affirmative answers to the first two do not automatically establish the third.

A contemporary UNICEF educational packet on interdependence refers to a World Affairs Council of Philadelphia declaration. However, the scan lacks the announced enclosure itself. It is therefore not used as independent confirmation of Beter's precise date or the complete wording. [S03]

The existence of debate about interdependence is not the problematic step in the argument. Such proposals can be analysed and criticised directly. The evidentiary leap is the claim that this particular programme explains a congressional decision. The same month on two calendars is insufficient.

We preserve Beter's explanation as his allegation rather than substituting an absurd caricature. The next chapter compares it with enacted law. That procedure is more useful than deciding an author's reliability from an impression of his voice or reputation.

> **An event may be real while its attributed motive remains unproved.**

Sources / notes: S01, S03

04 · The 1974 law: a decisive chronological test

Public Law 93-344 was enacted on 12 July 1974. Section 501 set an October 1 fiscal-year start beginning in 1976; section 502 provided for the July–September 1976 transition. The provisions are visible at 88 Stat. 321 in the original scan. [S02]

Beter correctly describes the forthcoming practical change. Yet the statute predates his own date for the declaration by more than a year. Legal enactment and subsequent commencement must not be collapsed into one event. [S01, S02]

Our assessment is narrow but consequential: a declaration dated that way does not explain an already enacted statute without further evidence of an earlier purpose. The specified provisions do not announce a commemorative purpose. This does not reveal every legislator’s thinking; it means that Beter’s explanation is not accepted as established.

One possible defence would posit an older common plan behind both events. That is a new proposition requiring its own earlier source. An explanation cannot be rescued by adding an invisible plan and then counting that plan as evidence already discovered.

This example matters beyond Beter. Reporting that a law took effect in a particular year does not establish when it originated or who initiated it. Proposal, passage, signature and implementation must first be compared. Sound chronology can identify a flaw that numerous additional quotations merely conceal.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · SEE EXPLANATION

*Declaration date given in AL09; not independent verification. [S01, S02]

> **12 July 1974 enactment ≠ 1 October 1976 commencement of the new calendar.**

Sources / notes: S01, S02

05 · 1974: a new economic order against established inequalities

The UN historical account explains the New International Economic Order as developing countries' demand to change unequal economic relationships. Resolutions 3201 and 3202 were adopted on 1 May 1974. Resources and the position of transnational corporations were among the issues. [S05]

This case disrupts the assumption that every "new order" necessarily originates with the same Western financial group. Demands to change rules may also come from states disadvantaged by existing arrangements. A proposal should be assessed by its substance rather than a similar slogan.

This does not automatically endorse every government invoking economic independence. State control of resources might expand public benefit or strengthen a domestic elite. Distinguishing those outcomes requires budgets, ownership conditions, distribution of returns and affected people's experiences.

Likewise, adopting a declaration does not establish implementation. We must follow which rules actually changed, who could block changes and how costs were distributed. A political proclamation is relevant evidence of objectives, not universal proof of their success.

RA09 uses this documentary context to check vocabulary. The distribution of power among states, financial enterprises and populations cannot be reduced to a single contest "for" or "against" world order. Frequently, competing proposals concern who will make the rules and who will bear their consequences.

> **Resistance to inequality can also speak the language of a "new order".**

Sources / notes: S05

06 · 1990: Bush’s programme and the test of implementation

George H. W. Bush used “new world order” in his address to Congress on 11 September 1990. In the Gulf crisis context, he placed it among objectives concerning cooperation and international arrangements. The original transcript permits reading the surrounding argument rather than a clipped sentence. [S04]

What does the speech establish? That the president publicly formulated that ambition. Alone it establishes neither universal submission to one centre nor secret family ownership. Conversely, publicly declaring cooperation does not guarantee equal bargaining or harmless subsequent interventions.

Eisenhower’s 1961 farewell warnings about unwarranted military-industrial influence and public policy becoming captive to a scientific-technological elite offer a comparison. These are different propositions from the existence of a single ruler of the world. [S32]

Our analytical question is which capabilities a particular coalition possessed, which proposals others resisted and which decisions actually followed. Treating a political slogan as an effective command ends inquiry at the point where it should begin.

It is reasonable to examine the gap between universal language and selective action. The test should be comparable cases and concrete procedures, not a presumption that every declaration of peace is necessarily a coded instruction for war. That makes criticism more precise, not weaker.

> **A speech proves an expressed ambition; implementation requires another record.**

Sources / notes: S04, S32

07 · The UN: equality of members and unequal powers

The UN Charter affirms members' sovereign equality while assigning special powers to the Security Council. Article 25 concerns accepting and carrying out Council decisions; Articles 41–42 distinguish measures without armed force from forcible measures. Article 27's voting provisions must be read with their amendments. [S06, S07]

"Not a world government" must therefore not become "has no power". The question is which organ issued which act under which authority. A recommendation, political declaration and decision binding member states cannot be conflated merely because they carry the UN name.

Formal inequality is visible without secret minutes: permanent members' special position permits blocking certain decisions. Blocking is not the same as independently imposing any desired decision. This asymmetry is a legitimate subject of criticism and reform debate.

For a particular intervention, separate the mandate, states providing resources, operational command and actual conduct. The same rule applies to inaction. Failure may result from conflict between powerful members, rather than perfectly coordinated manipulation.

The original 1945 scan is a historical text. We therefore do not derive today's required voting totals from its original numbers. This small editorial discipline expresses a larger rule: institutions must always be examined at a specified time.

> **Distinctive authority is not unlimited authority.**

Sources / notes: S06, S07

08 · The IMF: voting weight and blocking power

The IMF factsheet links member quotas with financial commitments and voting weight. It gives an 85-percent voting requirement for quota changes and requires a member’s consent to changing its own quota. This is a specific decision mechanism, not a general metaphor for owning the world. [S08]

The following calculation is purely didactic. Imagine 100 votes and an 85-vote approval threshold. An actor with 16 votes can block the proposal: everyone else has only 84. Those same 16 votes cannot enact that actor’s own proposal. This does not state any country’s current share.

The distinction clarifies claims about “control” of an international organisation. A veto or blocking minority is important leverage. It does not automatically turn all other members into subordinate units. Passing a positive decision still requires additional votes or agreements.

A conditional loan can restrict a borrower’s choices even without that voting mechanism. A specific coercion claim therefore requires the particular programme, conditions, alternatives and social consequences. This study does not pretend to audit every IMF lending programme.

With percentages, always specify the institution, denominator, decision type and date. A list of shares without a threshold can overlook real inequality or turn limited leverage into absolute command.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · SEE EXPLANATION

Hypothetical example; not a particular country’s voting share.

> **The ability to say no is not the independent ability to impose yes.**

Sources / notes: S08

09 · World Bank and BIS: similar words, different rules

The World Bank overview distinguishes voting arrangements for IBRD, IDA, IFC and MIGA. The BIS has its own statutes: Articles 14–15 separately regulate voting and eligible share acquirers. Transitional Article 18(A) records the repurchase of privately held shares in 2001. [S09, S10]

Two cautions follow. First, “world banks” is not the legal name of one entity. Second, later ownership rules must not be projected backwards across an entire history. A true statement about private holders in one period need not describe the later position.

Each diagram needs an institutional identifier, year, relevant provision and defined relationship. An arrow representing membership must not silently become secret command in the next paragraph. A central bank’s participation in the BIS does not itself establish that the BIS makes every decision of that bank.

Meaningful criticism can concern representation, assistance conditions, information access or accountability for a particular intervention. It need not depend on a claim that one family owns every institution. Such a claim requires separate ownership and decision records.

These sources orient the reader among institutional differences. They do not imply that the organisations’ decisions are invariably beneficial or politically neutral. Identifying the correct entity is a prerequisite for accountability, not a substitute for it.

> **Each institution needs its own authority map and its own date.**

Sources / notes: S09, S10

10 · The Fed: public bodies and special stock

The Federal Reserve’s official explanation distinguishes the federal Board of Governors from regional Reserve Banks. Member banks hold special Reserve Bank stock, not ordinary corporate ownership. The Board has a public appointment process and the system a statutory structure. [S11]

This contradicts a simple literal description of the whole system as an ordinary private share corporation. It does not automatically answer questions about privileged access, financial-sector perspectives or conflicts of interest. Each requires a different kind of evidence.

When examining a central bank, distinguish legal independence from social isolation. The ability to take monetary decisions without prior presidential approval does not imply that decision-makers lack professional connections. Conversely, a professional connection does not establish that a private contact ordered a particular decision.

A persuasive case requires a dated conflict, decision record, arguments presented, alternatives and a mechanism of benefit. Public minutes may be insufficient; they are still a better starting point than a chart conflating stock, appointment and advisory relationships.

The institutional FAQ is not a certificate of innocence. It supplies an initial account of the rules to prevent category errors. Inquiry into actual power continues where the formal diagram ends.

> **Formal independence, ownership and possible influence are different questions.**

Sources / notes: S11

11 · CFR and the Trilateral Commission: networks can be investigated

The Trilateral Commission identifies its establishment in 1973 and David Rockefeller’s founding role. The CFR describes its research, membership and discussion activities. These organisations are real; their public existence does not validate every allegation of state control. [S12, S14]

The important question is not merely “are they secret?” A public network can help determine which issues gain research support, attention or access to decision-makers. Influence research must therefore follow resources, participant selection, proposal formation and routes into public policy.

A membership list maps possible contacts. A working-group record, joint proposal or correspondence about a particular decision provides stronger evidence. A stronger case still identifies who secured adoption, which alternatives were excluded and who was responsible for the outcome.

The founder’s family name is not concealed here. Nor is it treated as proof that every later member follows a single command or that the organisation controls any non-member at will. Affiliation, shared interest and executed instruction remain distinct.

The next chapter shows why direct criticism of a specific text is more valuable than endless argument about labels. An actual publication can contain a seriously contestable political position without being a secret constitution for the world.

> **Access to powerful people matters; evidence of a specific instruction adds a further step.**

Sources / notes: S12, S14

12 · The Crisis of Democracy: do not soften an uncomfortable passage

In the US chapter of The Crisis of Democracy (1975), pages 113–115, Huntington discusses an “excess of democracy” and the function of political non-participation. The foreword distinguishes authorial responsibility from every consulted participant. We use the available OCR transcription of those passages. [S13]

This is a real, criticisable position. Concern about governability can lead to treating new civic demands primarily as burdens. From our evaluative perspective, the question becomes who may decide which people are participating “too much” in public debate.

An argument for expert authority may be appropriate within a narrowly defined technical task. It does not automatically settle whom policy should serve or who bears its risks. Experts can explain possible consequences; expertise alone does not grant an unlimited mandate to distribute rights.

It is unnecessary to dismiss every critical quotation from this book as invented. Equally, it is inaccurate to assign every sentence by one author as the personal statement of all commissioners. Turning the book’s argument into evidence of implemented state policy requires a further chain of adoption and execution.

Three propositions differ fundamentally: an author recommended an approach; an organisation supported publication; a government implemented it. The first two may be documented while the third remains to be tested. Direct criticism of elitist reasoning need not skip that distinction.

> **A published position can be criticised without inventing secret appendices.**

Sources / notes: S13

13 · Bilderberg: privacy does not mean absence of influence

The Bilderberg organiser describes private discussions without votes or resolutions. The Chatham House Rule permits use of information while protecting speakers' and participants' identities and affiliations. It is an attribution rule, not a prohibition on subsequently using ideas. [S15, S16]

The organiser's statement is not an independent guarantee that no understandings arise. Conversely, the lack of a public record does not prove whichever agreement a critic imagines. The correct description is a verification gap. Greater transparency can be demanded without pretending to know every conversation.

Informal power may involve building trust, narrowing acceptable alternatives or preparing later cooperation. Attributing such a mechanism to a particular meeting requires a trace in subsequent documents. Sequence alone is insufficient: participants may already have shared the view.

Public officials raise additional questions: who pays for attendance, in which capacity do they participate, and which disclosure obligations apply? This study does not decide an unexamined contemporary legal case; it identifies the information needed.

Selective access to decision-makers is itself a matter of public interest. It need not be inflated into global command to deserve scrutiny, nor dismissed as an innocent social evening.

> **Non-public discussion reduces verifiability; it does not determine the investigation's result.**

Sources / notes: S15, S16

14 · The Great Reset: a public programme is not an executed command

In his article of 3 June 2020, Klaus Schwab publicly proposed extensive renewal of capitalism and social systems. The text connects market reform, investment and technological change. We use the article, not the entire book or unexamined internal WEF documents. [S17]

The ambition need not be softened: the programme seeks to influence how major parts of society are organised. The issue is who may propose such changes and how they acquire legitimacy. A business platform can formulate a proposal; that alone gives it no democratic mandate over every citizen.

Investigation continues through the transmission mechanism. Which government, company or international organisation adopted which provision? What duties arose, which budget was approved and what remedies existed for affected people? Without these records, programme and implementation are conflated.

No choice is required between unqualified enthusiasm and an all-powerful secret government. Particularly important are conflicts between declared stakeholder inclusion and unequal ability to pay for expert representation. “Stakeholder” alone does not tell us whether a person without money or contacts has a voice.

Nor does using a crisis to advance a proposal itself prove that the author caused the crisis. An event’s cause and a political response are different research questions. Criticism carries greater weight when grounded in the programme’s actual provisions.

> **Specify the object of criticism: proposal, decision, implementation or consequence?**

Sources / notes: S17

15 · Agenda 2030: a goal, a national decision and rights

Agenda 2030 leaves room for national priorities in paragraphs 55 and 59; paragraph 74 describes voluntary, country-led review. Target 1.4 includes access to ownership and control of land and other property. That is not the wording of an automatic abolition of personal property. [S18]

Reading a programme does not end with finding one favourable sentence. Criticism of a particular policy must identify the enacted law or administrative measure, its effects and available remedies. An international goal does not justify every method invoking it.

Programmes can influence conduct without direct coercion by aligning vocabulary, indicators and funding priorities. That possible mechanism must be studied in a specific project. Simply declaring that a document is not a world constitution does not resolve all its consequences.

Conversely, a local policy’s reference to a sustainability goal does not establish a secret foreign instruction. Follow the drafting process, the decision-maker’s authority, the funding source and conditions. Those records distinguish voluntary adaptation from imposed conditions.

This chapter does not evaluate fulfilment of every goal by 2030. It examines the text’s meaning and the evidentiary steps needed to assess claims about its authority. Political assessment must remain attentive to specific costs and benefits.

> **An international goal and a coercive national act require separate documentation.**

Sources / notes: S18

16 · Managing other people’s assets is not owning them

The SEC’s 2019 interpretation stresses an investment adviser’s duties to clients, including care, loyalty and handling conflicts. It describes a client–service-provider relationship, not an automatic identity between client assets and provider wealth. [S19]

Consider our didactic example: clients entrust 100 monetary units to a manager whose contract charges an annual 1-percent fee. With an unchanged base, the gross fee is 1 unit, not 100. The calculation still says nothing about operating costs, profit, taxes or the firm’s market valuation.

The manager may nevertheless exercise delegated decision authority. Money not being the manager’s personal wealth does not mean the manager lacks influence. Contracts, voting rules, discretion and clients’ ability to revoke the mandate therefore matter.

Large assets-under-management numbers often become confused with three different quantities: client assets, service revenue and the value of an ownership stake in the management firm. Adding these into a single “fortune” is an accounting error. Chains of funds and external managers can also introduce double counting.

The critical question is therefore not merely how much money appears under a trading name. It is what the manager can decide, for whom, over which period and subject to what oversight. Limited ownership can coexist with substantial delegated power.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · SEE EXPLANATION

Hypothetical example: 100 × 0.01 = 1. Revenue is not yet net profit.

> **100 units under management ≠ 100 units of personal wealth.**

Sources / notes: S19

17 · 13F and N-PX: two different views of shares

SEC Form 13F separates investment discretion from voting authority. The 2022 N-PX reform announcement concerns disclosure of actual fund votes and certain manager votes. Holdings, authority to vote and a vote cast are different data. [S20, S21]

Imagine a table showing a share count beside a manager’s name. Without reading the column heading, we do not know whether it represents the manager’s economic interest, client assets or delegated authority. Moving from that table to “owns the company” can therefore be wrong even when the number is copied correctly.

This study offers no new aggregate of all EDGAR filings. It explains a procedure: identify report type and period, then units and coverage, then shared-reporting rules. Even “none” in a voting field must be read through the form’s definition rather than ordinary language.

To study coordinated voting, compare specific proposals, dates, votes cast and delegation rules. Matching votes on the same proposal may reflect a similar investment strategy; a particular agreement is a further evidentiary proposition.

A sound diagram can therefore distinguish economic benefit, investment authority and voting authority with different relationships. Merging them into one bold line is visually simple but may erase the distinction that determines the interpretation of power.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · SEE EXPLANATION

Reported holdings, authorisation and an actual vote are different data.

> **A correct number assigned to the wrong column produces a wrong conclusion.**

Sources / notes: S20, S21

18 · The number 147: what the research actually measured

In 2011 Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston studied a network derived from Orbis 2007, beginning with 43,060 transnational corporations. The finding concerning 147 core corporations and roughly four-tenths of control concerned modelled control over the economic value of the transnational corporations studied. [S22]

This is neither a list of 147 families nor a measurement of ownership of all wealth on Earth. Corporate value, ownership paths and the chosen conversion from ownership to control are components of the model. The appendices contain alternative specifications, not one natural constant.

The finding should not be trivialised. High concentration can matter for examining competition, dependence or systemic vulnerability. Relabelling the units as families would not enrich the result; it would change the object that was measured.

Our methodological assessment separates data, algorithm and political interpretation. Even an exact computation within a model may only partially represent actual decision-making. Voting agreements, legal constraints, client–manager distinctions and unrecorded relationships require additional information.

The 2007 data are not presented as a 2026 ranking. Nor have raw corporate records been reprocessed for this study. The contribution is accurate reading of the published result and separation from a popular but different claim about world government.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · SEE EXPLANATION

2007 DATA YEAR	43,060 STARTING TNCs	147 CORE CORPORATIONS

Vitali et al. 2011 [S22] · Not families or total world wealth.

> **147 corporations in a specified model is not 147 families owning the world.**

Sources / notes: S22

19 · A control model and intention are not the same

The abstract of Krause, Peixoto and Bornholdt’s 2013 modelling paper shows centralisation emerging from local rules without requiring a shared central objective. That is a model result, not empirical proof that real companies never make agreements. [S23]

Consider our simplified example. A owns 60 percent of B, and B owns 60 percent of C. Multiplying the shares gives A a 36-percent indirect economic interest in C. A model equating a simple majority with full control may nevertheless attribute control to A through both links. The answers differ because the questions differ. The assumptions are explicit. [S22]

A real case would require checking share classes, contracts, voting restrictions and the distribution of remaining votes. A fixed-threshold diagram is a teaching aid, not an automatic description of every enterprise.

Likewise, distinguish a network from a plan. Concentration may arise from deliberate agreements, similar incentives or both. Spontaneous-emergence models must not automatically absolve actors, while secret-plan claims must not replace missing correspondence or executed instructions.

When evaluating alternatives, ask which observation would distinguish them. An explanation loses testability if every possible result supposedly confirms it. A good model sharpens the questions put to data and does not conceal its simplifications.

EDITORIAL DIAGRAM · SEE EXPLANATION

Hypothetical multiplication of stakes: 0.60 × 0.60. Not a recorded order.

Economic interest, modelled control and demonstrated intent are three quantities.

Sources / notes: S22, S23

20 · Unequal political influence: what a study permits us to say

The abstract of Gilens and Page’s 2014 paper describes analysis of 1,779 policy issues. The authors report substantial independent effects for economic elites and business-oriented interest groups, but little or no independent influence for average citizens within the model used. [S24]

That is a serious conclusion and should not be dismissed merely because it challenges an idealised picture of democracy. Precision nevertheless requires preserving the country, research design and meaning of “independent”. It is not an experiment proving every citizen irrelevant at every time.

Our explanation is straightforward: when two groups support the same proposal and it passes, agreement alone does not reveal which group was decisive. Separating their relationships to outcomes requires comparisons and modelling assumptions. Overlapping preferences can make a simple “one group won, another lost” account misleading.

For this edition, the publisher abstract was accessible, not a complete independently recomputed dataset. We therefore do not assess every robustness test or extend the conclusion to the entire world. The paper is documented evidence for debate about unequal influence, not a genealogy of one concealed dynasty.

Further research would require a period, definition of elites, measures of preferences and outcomes, and alternative explanations. This makes criticism of inequality no less urgent. It gives it a precise object and the possibility of correction.

> **Inequality should be measured; measuring it does not automatically identify a single commander.**

Sources / notes: S24

21 · Lobbying and policy capture

The OECD distinguishes policy capture from interest representation itself; its framework allows distortion through legal channels too. The public LDA database permits searches by registrant, client, issue and contacted government body. [S25, S31]

European Court of Auditors report 05/2024, covering 2019–2022, found useful transparency-register information alongside coverage and quality gaps. Problems included inconsistent financial data and uncovered spontaneous contacts. This is a dated finding, not an automatic description of the entire 2026 position. [S26]

Both errors are dangerous. Registration does not establish that an official was bought. Absence of an entry does not establish that no contact occurred. Researchers need the reporting obligations and coverage of the database they use.

For a specific suspicion, construct a chain: client demand, submitted proposal, contact, public decision and distribution of benefit. A large expenditure alone does not prove lobbying success. Comparable texts, dated meetings and an explanation of excluded alternatives provide stronger evidence.

Our ethical assessment includes legally permissible inequality of access. Harm to the public interest need not take the form of a criminal bribe. At the same time, “public interest” must be explained and open to debate, not simply used as another name for the author’s preferences.

> **Legality is not automatically fairness; a contact record is not automatically a bribe.**

Sources / notes: S25, S26, S31

22 · When coordination leaves concrete evidence

On 20 May 2015 the US Department of Justice announced plea agreements by Citicorp, JPMorgan, Barclays and RBS concerning foreign-exchange manipulation. The statement describes traders coordinating through electronic chat. A separate UBS plea in the same announcement concerned LIBOR, not that same FX case. [S27]

The case matters because it is not a general impression. The announcement identifies enterprises, a market, conduct and a procedural step. Readers can pursue subsequent court documents; this study does not provide the entire later procedural history.

Particular traders' conduct is not inferred from ancestry or faith. It rests on the reported agreements and actions. Nor can this case establish that all banks set all exchange rates through a single command. Enlarging the scope requires additional evidence.

Conversely, competition and regulation are no reason why a cartel "could not" occur. The real world can contain rivalry and rule-breaking cooperation simultaneously. Each has its own scope and period.

The case therefore calibrates the evidentiary standard. An agreement claim should specify between whom, about what, when, through which channel and with what consequence. Rather than weakening criticism of finance, this provides a way to distinguish seriously documented conduct from an unlimited legend.

> **A specific agreement needs specific actors, a channel and an object.**

Sources / notes: S27

23 · Sanctions: real leverage without ownership

Treasury’s 2021 review describes financial sanctions as a state-policy tool, alongside limitations and the need to mitigate unintended effects. Footnote 2 distinguishes blocking property from transferring title: an owner may remain the owner while unable freely to deal with the asset. [S28]

This precisely illustrates why ownership is not the only form of power. The ability to restrict payments, access or asset use can have major consequences. Explaining it does not require claiming that the sanctioning authority owns every affected bank or asset.

An official strategy document evaluates the instrument from its user’s perspective. It is not an independent balance sheet of all successes and harms. Ethical and empirical scrutiny must follow the intended objective, specific target, actual effect and consequences for third parties.

Also distinguish the ability to impose costs from the ability to achieve a political goal. An actor can suffer serious harm without changing behaviour. Failed pressure does not mean leverage never existed; it means outcomes depended on additional factors.

RA09 does not give instructions on complying with or circumventing particular current sanctions. It presents a dated example of legal authority, economic dependence and limitations. The argumentative role is clear: global power can be investigated through public powers, not only ownership genealogies.

> **Blocking, transfer of ownership and achieving an objective are not the same.**

Sources / notes: S28

24 · Beter’s model and the results of this inquiry

At the end of AL24, Beter alleges that Trilateral Commission figures control the federal government and connects this to future control of water after catastrophe and war. The later 1983 digest develops a long-term commitment to one world government. These are assertions made by those texts. [S29, S30]

RA09 does not confirm them as one unified explanatory model. It documents real organisations, public programmes, unequal powers, concentration research and particular financial coordination. Adding them together does not automatically establish common command over all the actors examined.

The AL09 example is especially useful: Beter describes a real calendar change but attributes a motive unsupported by the compared statute and requiring an explanation of its earlier enactment. Other cases show that criticisable material need not be softened: political non-participation, unequal access and cartels can be addressed through direct evidence. [S01, S02, S13, S26, S27]

We do not declare an unavailable secret document nonexistent merely because we lack it. Nor can we treat it as evidence obtained. An author’s assertion about such a document remains an assertion until its provenance, wording and connection with decisions are verified.

The conclusion neither absolves all powerful actors nor judges every sentence Beter ever uttered. It is a bounded assessment of particular cases. The historical synthesis of his “thousand-year war” remains for RA11, current regional conflicts for RA12. Individual and institutional accountability survives the rejection of collective guilt.

> **Verifiability does not weaken criticism of power; it separates it from invention.**

Sources / notes: S01, S02, S13, S26, S27, S29, S30

Mechanisms of power: what needs evidence

An analytical orientation table. Not a ranking of world rulers or a claim that one actor holds every mechanism below.

Mechanism	Relevant evidence	What it alone does not establish
Authority	Charter, statute, constitution; effective version. [S06, S07, S10]	Success of every decision or absence of informal influence.
Blocking votes	Majority rule and verified voting weight. [S08]	Ability to pass one’s own proposal alone.
Ownership	Stake, share class, economic and voting rights. [S11, S20]	Identity of manager and ultimate economic owner.
Delegated management	Mandate, legal duties, actual votes. [S19, S21]	That all managed assets are the manager’s own wealth.
Agenda-setting	Invitations, membership, funding, proposal and later adoption. [S12, S14, S17]	That every participant executed every proposal.
Policy influence	Access, meeting, input into a draft and a dated decision. [S25, S26, S31]	That contact alone caused the outcome.
Coordination	Communication about a specific agreement and documented conduct. [S27]	Single command over every market and institution.
Coercive leverage	Legal instrument, target, costs and actual effect. [S28]	Transfer of ownership or achievement of the intended objective.

Claim register · C01–C05

C01 · The same phrase “new order” proves a single historical project.

Assessment: Not established

The programmes have different authors, objectives and settings. Shared words do not replace evidence of organisational continuity. [S04, S05, S17]

C02 · The October fiscal year was enacted to commemorate the declaration Beter dates to October 1975.

Assessment: Unsupported motive; chronological problem

The law was enacted on 12 July 1974. Later effectiveness is not enactment. A prior plan would require additional evidence; the declaration’s own date is not independently verified here. [S01, S02, S03]

C03 · The UN either has no binding power or is already a single world government.

Assessment: False dichotomy

The Charter distinguishes organs’ powers and states’ sovereign equality. Council authority, voting and implementation are separate questions. [S06, S07]

C04 · The ability to block a decision is the same as the ability to adopt it alone.

Assessment: Incorrect equivalence

With an 85-percent threshold, a hypothetical 16 out of 100 votes blocks but cannot adopt a proposal alone. This is not a current country share. [S08]

C05 · Assets under management are the manager’s own property.

Assessment: Incorrect as a general rule

Management mandate, fiduciary duties, economic claim and voting must be separated. Delegated power may be significant without owning the entire amount. [S19, S20, S21]

Claim register · C06–C10

C06 · Research found 147 families owning roughly 40% of the entire world.

Assessment: Distortion of units and scope

Vitali and colleagues studied a corporate ownership-network model using 2007 data. The number describes core corporations and modelled control, not families, a current ranking or all world wealth. [S22]

C07 · Gilens and Page proved that the same elite controls every political decision worldwide.

Assessment: Beyond the source

The accessible abstract assesses independent effects in the studied US policy issues. It does not establish a single secret body or zero importance of every vote in every setting. [S24]

C08 · Private discussion itself proves a secret binding decision.

Assessment: Not established

A confidentiality rule and format description do not reveal every conversation. Privacy therefore neither proves an agreement nor guarantees lack of influence. [S15, S16]

C09 · Specific financial coordination cannot be documented.

Assessment: General claim contradicted

The announced 2015 plea agreements identify particular banks and conduct. The case does not license extending the conclusion to every bank or market. [S27]

C10 · Adding these organisations together confirms Beter’s common world command.

Assessment: Not confirmed in this inquiry

Documented programmes, inequalities, networks and a cartel remain distinct cases. An independently verified linking chain establishing a single command is missing. [S01, S12, S13, S22, S27, S29, S30]

Chronology · 1

1945	UN Charter: distinctions among organs, powers and sovereign equality. [S06]
17. 1. 1961	Eisenhower’s farewell address warns against unwarranted influence. [S32]
1973	Trilateral Commission founded, according to its own history. [S12]
1. 5. 1974	Resolutions on a new international economic order. [S05]
12. 7. 1974	Enactment of Public Law 93-344, including the fiscal-calendar change. [S02]
1975	The Crisis of Democracy: authored analyses and discussion under commission auspices. [S13]
24. 10. 1975*	Philadelphia declaration date as given by Beter; not independently confirmed in RA09. [S01, S03]
16. 2. 1976	AL09 gives an explanation of the October fiscal-year start. [S01]
1. 10. 1976	Start under the new arrangement after the transition quarter. [S02]
28. 5. 1977	AL24 connects the commission with alleged control of government and future resources. [S29]
1983	Later Bird’s-Eye View summarises the one-world-government account. [S30]

Chronology · 2

11. 9. 1990	Bush’s speech uses “new world order” in the Gulf-crisis context. [S04]
2001	BIS transition concerning privately held shares. [S10]
2007 → 2011	Ownership-data year and publication year of Vitali and colleagues’ research. [S22]
2013 / 2014	Spontaneous-concentration model / unequal-influence study; abstracts used here. [S23, S24]
20. 5. 2015	DOJ announces bank plea agreements; FX and LIBOR are not the same case. [S27]
25. 9. 2015	Adoption of the 2030 Agenda. [S18]
2017 / 2019	OECD policy-capture framework / SEC fiduciary interpretation. [S25, S19]
3. 6. 2020	Schwab’s public Great Reset article. [S17]
2021 / 2022	Treasury sanctions review / adoption of N-PX reporting changes. [S28, S21]
2024	European transparency-register audit; examined period 2019–2022. [S26]

Glossary of working terms

Authority. Formal competence to decide within a defined field. Not a guarantee of successful implementation.

Influence. Capacity to alter others' decisions or options; its mechanism must be specified.

Leverage. A dependency or instrument enabling pressure. In this study it does not refer only to financial borrowing.

Coordination. Aligned conduct whose object, participants and scope need evidence.

Agenda-setting. Selection of issues, participants and options that enter a discussion.

Policy capture. In the OECD framework, repeated redirection of public decisions toward a narrow interest at public expense. [S25]

Assets under management. Assets managed under a mandate; not automatically the manager's own net worth.

Economic claim. Entitlement to a stream of returns or value; it need not match voting rights.

Voting right. Entitlement to vote under a particular rule or class of interest.

Fiduciary duty. In the cited regulatory framework, duties of care and loyalty toward a client. [S19]

Modelled control. A quantity calculated under model rules; not a direct record of executed orders.

Veto or blocking. Ability to prevent a proposal's adoption; its legal meaning depends on the system concerned.

Cartel. An agreement restricting competition; a specific legal conclusion must be tied to a case and conduct.

Confidentiality. A restriction on disclosure or attribution. It does not automatically determine truth or binding force.

Enactment / effectiveness. Adopting a rule and the time it begins to operate can have different dates.

Causal claim. A claim that one fact caused another; it requires more than temporal or verbal resemblance.

Source register · S01–S06

S01 · Peter David Beter · Audio Letter 09

16. 2. 1976 · Úvod / opening paragraphs

Available transcript; declaration and fiscal-year passage. Audio was not re-audited. The declaration date is Beter's statement, not an independently verified date.

https://www.peterdavidbeter.com/docs/all/dbal09.html

S02 · Public Law 93-344 · Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act

12. 7. 1974 · 88 Stat. 321 · Title V, §§ 501–502

Primary statutory scan; relevant page visually verified. Establishes enacted provisions and transition quarter, not every legislator's personal motives.

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-88/pdf/STATUTE-88-Pg297.pdf

S03 · U.S. Committee for UNICEF · Interdependence—Spirit of 1976

1976 · ERIC ED133238 · 9-stranový sken / 9-page scan, časť / section How to Get Started

Contemporary educational packet inspected. Refers to an enclosed World Affairs Council of Philadelphia declaration, but that enclosure's text is absent from the available scan.

https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED133238.pdf

S04 · George H. W. Bush · Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress

11. 9. 1990 · Pasáž o piatom cieli / passage on the fifth objective

Complete available presidential transcript. Used for the phrase in historical context, not as evidence that the programme was fulfilled.

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-persian-gulf-crisis-and-the-federal-budget

S05 · Ahmed Mahiou / UN Audiovisual Library · New International Economic Order

1974 / neskorší výklad / later commentary · Historical introduction and procedural history · resolutions 3201, 3202 (S-VI)

Signed legal-historical introduction and procedural history on the UN site. No claim of separately inspecting the original printed resolution.

https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_3201/ga_3201.html

S06 · Charter of the United Nations · original text

26. 6. 1945 · Articles 2, 10, 24–25, 41–42

Original text; specified articles used. Original Article 27 vote totals are not presented as today's rules; see S07.

https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf

Source register · S07–S12

S07 · United Nations Repertory · Article 27

stav stránky / page accessed 11. 10. 2026 · Current wording and amendment history

Official wording and amendment history. Not a comprehensive assessment of every contested voting practice.

https://legal.un.org/repertory/art27.shtml

S08 · International Monetary Fund · IMF Quotas

prístup / accessed 11. 10. 2026 · Factsheet · quota increases and voting

Institutional factsheet; role of quotas and 85-percent requirement for quota changes. No unverified current country voting share is supplied.

https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2022/IMF-Quotas

S09 · World Bank · Voting Powers

prístup / accessed 11. 10. 2026 · IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA explanatory sections

Rules distinguished by institution in the overview; not a downloaded and audited complete voting dataset.

https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/who-we-are/board-of-directors/voting-powers

S10 · Bank for International Settlements · Statutes

znenie / text 7. 11. 2016; Basic Texts 2019 · Articles 3, 14–15, 18(A)

Specified articles, including the 2001 transition, consulted. Not a full BIS history audit or audit of current informal connections.

https://www.bis.org/pages/legal-information/statutes-en.pdf

S11 · Board of Governors · Who owns the Federal Reserve?

aktualizované / updated 28. 5. 2026 · FAQ

Official account of public and private elements. An institution’s explanation is not an independent audit of its impartiality.

https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_14986.htm

S12 · The Trilateral Commission · About Us

prístup / accessed 11. 10. 2026 · Founding in 1973; purpose and membership

Organisation’s own account and founder identification. Membership alone does not establish executed instructions or coordination on every issue.

https://www.trilateral.org/about/

Source register · S13–S17

S13 · Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, Joji Watanuki · The Crisis of Democracy

1975 · Foreword; Huntington, The United States, pp. 113–115

Electronic OCR transcript of the foreword and specified pages used, not a new critical edition. Full PDF scan could not be retrieved; book charts are not reproduced.

https://archive.org/stream/TheCrisisOfDemocracy-TrilateralCommission-1975/crisis_of_democracy_djvu.txt

S14 · Council on Foreign Relations · Mission Statement

prístup / accessed 11. 10. 2026 · Mission statement

Documentation of the publicly stated mission. Not an inventory of every member contact or decision.

https://www.cfr.org/about/mission-statement

S15 · Bilderberg Meetings · Frequently Asked Questions

prístup / accessed 11. 10. 2026 · Private discussion; voting and resolutions

Organiser’s own explanation of the meeting format. An assertion of no resolutions is not proof of no informal influence.

https://www.bilderbergmeetings.org/frequently-asked-questions

S16 · Chatham House · Chatham House Rule

prístup / accessed 11. 10. 2026 · Rule and explanatory questions

Rule for using information without revealing identity and affiliation; not a general legal privilege.

https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chatham-house-rule

S17 · Klaus Schwab · Now is the time for a great reset of capitalism

3. 6. 2020 · Author’s public programme

Article used, not the entire book of the same name. Proposal, state adoption and implementation are separated.

https://www.weforum.org/stories/sustainable-development/now-is-the-time-for-a-great-reset/

Source register · S18–S22

S18 · United Nations · Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda

25. 9. 2015 · Paragraphs 55, 59, 74; target 1.4

Specified sections of the complete available text; not an audit of achievement or every implementing law.

https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda

S19 · SEC · Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers

5. 6. 2019 · Release IA-5248 · pp. 6–9, 21–24

Historical regulatory interpretation on care, loyalty and conflicts. Not personal investment or legal advice.

https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf

S20 · SEC · Form 13F and instructions

formulár / form 07-23; prístup / accessed 11. 10. 2026 · Special instruction 11; columns 6 and 8; final table

Instructions and blank table inspected; final page visually verified. No new processing of all EDGAR filings was performed.

https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form13f.pdf

S21 · SEC · SEC Adopts Rules to Enhance Proxy Voting Disclosure

2. 11. 2022 · Form N-PX adoption announcement

2022 rule-adoption announcement and purpose; not an audit of a particular fund vote.

https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022-198

S22 · Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, Stefano Battiston · The Network of Global Corporate Control

2011 · Preprint pp. 2–7, appendix tables S2–S3; PLOS ONE 6(10), e25995

Available text and appendix; numerical tables visually verified. The 2007 dataset was not reanalysed.

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1107.5728

Source register · S23–S27

S23 · Sebastian M. Krause, Tiago P. Peixoto, Stefan Bornholdt · Spontaneous centralization of control in a network of company ownerships

2013 · Abstract

Abstract of a modelling paper used, not a simulation replication or empirical disproof of every coordinated action.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.3422

S24 · Martin Gilens, Benjamin I. Page · Testing Theories of American Politics

2014 · Perspectives on Politics 12(3), pp. 564–581 · abstract

Publisher abstract describing 1,779 issues and conclusions was accessible. No independent replication or detailed robustness check is claimed.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001595

S25 · OECD · Preventing Policy Capture: Integrity in Public Decision Making

2017 · Executive summary, printed pp. 9–11

Full volume available; definition and framework from executive summary used. Not a new country audit.

https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2017/03/preventing-policy-capture_g1g78280/9789264065239-en.pdf

S26 · European Court of Auditors · Special report 05/2024: EU Transparency Register

16. 4. 2024 · Executive summary; paras 34, 59–82 · audit period 2019–2022

Audit and its time scope used directly. Findings are not automatically asserted to describe the complete 2026 register.

https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2024-05/SR-2024-05_EN.pdf

S27 · U.S. Department of Justice · Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas

20. 5. 2015 · FX pleas of four banks; separate UBS LIBOR plea

Contemporary announcement of plea agreements. Four-bank FX cartel distinguished from separate UBS matter; not a record of every subsequent procedural step.

https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas

Source register · S28–S32

S28 · U.S. Treasury · The Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review

október / October 2021 · pp. 1–7, including footnote 2

Treasury’s strategic self-assessment, including limits and blocking/ownership distinction. Not an independent balance sheet of successes.

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Treasury-2021-sanctions-review.pdf

S29 · Peter David Beter · Audio Letter 24

28. 5. 1977 · Topic 3 · closing passages

Available transcript; selected claims about the Trilateral Commission and water. Audio and all military allegations were not re-audited.

https://www.peterdavidbeter.com/docs/all/dbal24.html

S30 · Bird’s-Eye View · Dr. Beter Audio Letter Reference Digest

Audio Books Inc. · 1983 · Opening attribution; historical and one-world passages

Later digest, not a new original Audio Letter. Assertions about secret directives and commitments do not substitute for those documents.

https://www.peterdavidbeter.com/docs/all/dbeye.html

S31 · LDA.gov · Search LD-1 and LD-2 Reports

prístup / accessed 11. 10. 2026 · Public search fields

Registrant, client, period, issues and government-contact fields inspected. No full dataset downloaded and no amount assigned to an unverified actor.

https://lda.gov/filings/public/filing/search/

S32 · Dwight D. Eisenhower · Farewell Address

17. 1. 1961 · NARA transcript · military-industrial and scientific-technological passages

Original speech in archival transcription. Warning about influence is not itself proof of every later allegation.

https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/president-dwight-d-eisenhowers-farewell-address

Reader’s procedure and edition information

Begin a new power claim with its exact sentence, named actor and date. Identify whether it concerns a declaration, authority, ownership, management, contact or an executed instruction. Do not use “control” without an object and a mechanism.

Record the source actually available: original, transcription, excerpt, abstract or later digest. Mark missing enclosures too. A picture of a book cover is not evidence that every chapter has been examined.

For every number, supply its unit, denominator, period and method. Label the meaning of an arrow connecting two people. For shared membership, seek evidence of specific conduct; an independent decision does not establish the absence of every influence.

Also state in advance what would weaken a claim. If every disagreement is interpreted as staged and every missing document as perfect concealment, a correct account can no longer be distinguished from an incorrect one.

The edition’s normative framework is equal human dignity, individual and institutional accountability, and rejection of collective guilt. This does not imply that all historical programmes shared those values. Criticism of power does not need guilt assigned by religion, nation or genealogy.

RA09 · first editorial edition · v1.0 · 11 October 2026. Created with AI assistance; not a peer-reviewed monograph. Authorship of historical texts belongs to the named authors. The atmospheric archive-table illustration is identified reuse from the series, not an archival image; new diagrams are editorial.

This volume does not change the website’s main index or earlier publications. Planned next parts are RA10 on Beter’s beliefs, sources and claims; RA11 as the historical synthesis of his “thousand-year war”; and RA12 for separately dated contemporary context. Corrections should carry a new version number and an explanation of the change.